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Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning

Demonstrates the first practical black-box adversarial attack on a remote DNN using only its output labels, via a locally trained substitute model.

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Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning

By Nicolas Papernot, P. Mcdaniel, I. Goodfellow et al.ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
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This paper introduces the first practical black-box attack against machine learning models such as deep neural networks, which are vulnerable to adversarial examples, malicious inputs modified to produce erroneous outputs while looking unmodified to humans. Unlike all prior adversarial attacks, which require knowledge of the target's internals or its training data, the only capability assumed here is observing the labels the target assigns to inputs the attacker chooses. The strategy trains a local substitute model to imitate the target, using inputs synthetically generated by the adversary and labeled by querying the target, then uses that substitute to craft adversarial examples.

In a properly blinded, real-world evaluation, adversarial examples crafted against the substitute successfully transferred to the target models. A DNN hosted by MetaMind's online API misclassified 84.24% of the crafted examples, while logistic-regression substitutes against Amazon and Google models yielded misclassification rates of 96.19% and 88.94%, and the approach also evaded defenses previously shown to make adversarial crafting harder. By showing that mere query access suffices to attack deployed models, the work exposed a serious and general security risk for machine learning systems.

Abstract

DNNs and other ML models are vulnerable to adversarial examples: inputs subtly modified to cause misclassification while appearing unchanged to humans. Prior attacks required access to the model internals or training data, but this work presents the first practical attack needing only the labels the target assigns to chosen inputs. The adversary trains a local substitute on synthetic inputs labeled by the target, then crafts adversarial examples that transfer to it. Against models hosted by MetaMind, Amazon, and Google, misclassification reached 84.24%, 96.19%, and 88.94%.

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adversarial examplesblack-box attacksmachine learning securitydeep neural networkssubstitute modeltransferability
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